In this article I argue the need for a reflexive use of photographic images in research, mainly in the publication and dissemination phase and specifically when the topic investigated relates to issues of visibility, in this case racism and understandings of beauty. This analysis draws on my work on contemporary practices of racism in Mexico, where personal photographs were used as research-tools in life-story interviews, creating a sense of shared intimacy. Inspired by Barthes' refusal in Camera Lucida (2000) to reproduce a photograph of his mother, in this article I focus on the dynamics between seeing and looking and suggest that 'looking emotionally' at both participants' accounts and their photographic images, is a way to address the complexities of the gaze and discuss the specificity of different 'ways of looking'.
Introduction: On Seeing and Looking
I cannot reproduce the Winter Garden Photograph. It exists only for me. For you, it would be nothing but an indifferent picture, one of the thousand manifestations of the 'ordinary'; it cannot in any way constitute the visible object of a science; it cannot establish an objectivity, in the positive sense of the term; at most it would interest your stadium: period, clothes, photogeny; but in it, for you, no wound. (Barthes, 2000: 73) Photographs inhabit the visible; they are at the same time a visual expression and a sign to be decoded; they move within 'chains of meanings', from the cultural practice of producing them to 'the cultural practice of looking and interpretation' (Hall, 1999: 310) . As such, important aspects that comes into play when reading an image are 'the subjective capacities of the viewer to make images signify' (ibid.). Barthes' reflection above on 'the' photograph, the motif of his Camera Lucida, is puzzling in its refusal to reproduce this image and in the implications this has for the audience of his text.
The image dates to 1898 and shows his mother, when she was five years old, with her brother, then seven. They are 'standing together at the end of a little wooden bridge in a glassed-in conservatory, what was called a Winter Garden in those days' (Barthes, 2000: 67) . Barthes found this picture in his mother's apartment just after her death when looking at her photographs: 'gradually moving back in time with her, looking for the truth of the face I had loved. And I found it' (ibid.) In a loving and poetic manner he describes to us the detail of a 'just image' that could give him a sense of justice and accuracy in the midst of his grief. He doesn't want to run the risk of reducing his mother to the 'ordinary' and chooses not to show the picture. It seems as if he doesn't trust us -the viewers and readers of the text -and our subjective capacities, to make this image signify. It exists only for him, for us it would be 'indifferent'. While Barthes' resistance might be understood as honouring the 'wound' of love, longing and absence, throughout his book there is a sense that we do get to look at the Winter Garden photograph even if we don't see it, even if it is never shown to us. But still we don't see it: it is not physically printed on the page. Barthes' 'teasing' has triggered and engaged debates about the relation between words and image. He is emphasising the context of interpretation where this image should, if shown, be understood. Hirsch (1997) , for example, similarly to Mitchell's 'imagetext' (1994) , describes how the Winter Garden photograph 'has been transformed into a "prose picture" ' (1997: 3) since we only have the words Barthes uses and his reaction: the rejection of showing the image.
In this article, I shall discuss the implications of using images to exemplify and disseminate research analysis focusing on the dynamics of showing, seeing and looking in specific contexts. The benefits of showing and seeing specific images go beyond the mere function of illustration, pointing towards their pedagogical, political or 'raising-consciousness' advantages. There is an expectation that the production, collection or display of certain images will allow understanding or at least be the starting point of dialogue of the issues at stake (consider, for example, Back, 2004; Knowles, 2006) . This position has not, however, gone unchallenged. A relevant example is Apel's (2003) excellent article about the touring exhibition Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photographs in America (2000 America ( -2002 . Apel discusses the heated debate generated in the United States, especially among African Americans, about whether to show a collection of photographs of lynchings that took place between 1880 and 1960. Mainly coming from the United States' 'Deep South', some of these images -as with Barthes' Winter Garden picture -were family photographs found in drawers, dusty corners, old chests in attics or family albums next to images of birthdays, weddings and vacations. In these photographs, lynch mobs smile proudly at the camera while cheering one of the most terrifying acts of racial violence. Overall Apel's article argues that the consensus was for showing these images. While some were worried about the commercialisation of the suffering of 'black' people or that it would arouse 'black' rage and resentment against 'whites', the arguments for showing the images were more compelling. This is clearly summarised in the recognition that 'the reasons one might be disinclined to show such photographs "are outweighed by the importance of showing how people who otherwise believed in basic democratic principles turned into self-exonerating murderers"' (Apel, 2003: 466, citing Bauerlein). But Apel sensed an urge amongst the reviewers of the exhibition for witnessing, and explores how the exchange of looks is potent and even vital. For example, she quotes a New York Times analyst writing that 'we are a crowd looking at a crowd looking at a lynching. And we are looking at the lynching too. Again and again, a white mob looks back at us ' (2003: 460) . It is this exchange of gazes, the fluidity of subject (is it the mob, or the victim, or the gaze of the white mob looking back to the spectators?) and the possibilities of (dis)connection that gave this exhibition the potential to shake the subjective capacities of its viewers to make these images signify both politically and intimately.
The stark contrast between Barthes' intimate setting and these lynching photographs could imply that we are dealing with obviously different senses of 'gravity'. While both of these cases deal with images found in familial contexts that are about death and witnessing, the arguments for whether or not to show these images seem to be based largely in a questioning of the audience's capacity to make such images signify; can we trust the viewer? This question raises at least two other ones: who are the 'we' deciding? And who are the viewers? We could say that it is understandable not to show a family picture as it 'enlarges' its dimensions and adds weight to the narrative of a man facing death and honouring his intimacy with his mother (apart from elaborating one of the most important and now classic works on photography). It is Barthes' prerogative. And, the 'not showing' makes this image poignant. We could also say it is understandable, then, that the showing of lynching photographs might be seen as necessary to humanize the victims 'through "bearing witness", that is, through the act of looking and seeing' as active engagement that condemns racial hatred (2003: 467) . But also, we might add, to shock the viewers, to open debate and perhaps to educate them. And here, the showing of gazes at play is what also makes these images poignant.
In this article, however, I propose a different approach to photographic images that extends both of these debates to a common ground. My interest is not in the explicit depiction of racism but in the subtle and everyday context of its reproduction and recognition through family photographs. Simultaneously, like Barthes' 'protection' of his mother's reduction to the 'ordinary', I am concerned with the need to honour the intimacy created in my research between the participants and myself, while being aware of the extent one can or should exercise this safeguard. The two examples above deal, amongst other things, with issues of representation and meaning in terms of being able to (dis)connect the viewer with, say, death and justice (and of course issues of racial hatred). What I want to do here is extend the discussion about seeing and looking at photographic images to the context of research processes that investigate issues defined and produced by the same visibility, such as race and beauty. I am concerned both with the ambivalence of making use of the visible to 'understand' while acknowledging the need to denounce that same visibility as core to the production of forms of racism.
Based on research that uses personal photographs as central to the exploration of contemporary practices of racism in Mexico, I shall discuss the implications of using such images to exemplify and disseminate the analysis. This research project was concerned with a group of Mexican mestiza (racially mixed) women and their experiences of racism from the particular perspective of the visible, that is, the ways they see and are seen; the elements that interact to inform their gaze; the meanings and values of the metaphor of their own image. The participants' social conditions as women and mestizas reproduce sexual and racial identities as stereotypes and prevailing postcolonial relationships: they are located within a context of being a visually fixed, stereotyped other where their bodies and skins are 'signifiers of discrimination [that] must be processed as visible' (Bhabha, 1999: 376) .
In this context the use of photographic images proved to be a poignant method in researching a social phenomena marked by its visibility. It is my argument that showing and publishing these kinds of research-tool images as part of strategies of research dissemination has not been thoroughly problematised. I suggest that it is even more important to theorise issues of intimacy and trust when dealing with personal photographs than with other types of 'found images' that are 'out-in-theworld', or images produced through research processes by or with participants.
Here, when I speak of images, I refer specifically to the photographic image and to the 'images we imagine': those subjective images created mentally within specific socio-historical contexts and in dialogue with words, texts and narratives. Following Rose (2007) I also distinguish between vision (the capacity of the human eye to 'see ') and visuality (the variety of social and cultural elements that construct, determine and structure such capacity of seeing) from the notion of visibility. Visibility can be understood both as 'the capacity of being seen' 1 but also as the political degree to which specific issues, identities, concerns, become publicly prominent, somehow 'exposed' and socially highlighted (Porfido, 2006; Puwar, 2004) . The use of images in my research allowed the both participants and myself to grasp that the visibility of specific forms of racism were part of their everyday experience mainly in relation to their ideas of beauty and their family life. I will now turn to an example of this work to explore the 'common ground' where racism, visibility and research meet.
Sharing the Seeing of Beauty
And then I looked at myself and I said 'I'm not that bad'. I was so ashamed, as In these two extracts the possibility of accessing the visible is redefined as an individual process that is never 'innocent' or a mere starting point in the process of looking. Patricia is talking about her capacity to make a fair and coherent judgement of her appearance and the struggle between sets of criteria that pull her perception in different directions. On the one hand, she sees her image in a photograph and is able to grant a value to her ability to see herself and to distinguish what she sees: "I wasn't that bad", "I'm all right". On the other, she has an idea of herself and she is also able to give a value to it: "I was so ashamed, as if I was some kind of monster". This type of tension between evidence and interpretation, between seeing and feeling, is clearly revealed in Patricia's extract, and has been thoroughly analysed by various scholars who reject the simplistic correlation of photography with 'truth' and 'reality' (Lalvani, 1996; Sekula, 1982 Sekula, , 1983 Tagg, 1988) . Analyses of photography have been readily concerned with issues of content and representation, of how images accrue value. I want to extend this understanding to include the problems of how to judge viewers' interpretations of images (Poole, 1997) and how photography and political claims of visibility meet. Gell's (1999) argument about artworks as traps is compelling and useful for the understanding and use of photography proposed here:
A trap … communicates a deadly absence -the absence of the man [sic] who devised and set it, and the absence of the animal who will become the victim.
Because of these marked absences, the trap, like all traps, functions like a powerful sign. Not designed to communicate or to function as a sign (in fact, designed to be hidden and escape notice) the trap nonetheless signifies far more intensely than most signs intended as such.
[…] Since this is a sign that is not, officially, a sign at all, it escapes all censorship' (Gell, 1999: 200) .
Arguing for a complex understanding of photography as traps means considering photography's capacity to illustrate, explain and evoke but also, simultaneously, to fascinate, give pleasure and ensnare (we would still like to see the Winter Garden Photograph; the lynching photographs compels the viewer to look; maybe Patricia is "that bad" -let us see!). Such an understanding invites us to consider how we think about the use and content of photographs as research tools. But it also implies that the role of a photograph as part of a published text or a conference presentation has to be continuously critically assessed (for Barthes it's straightforward: "It exists only for me" whereas for Apel, the exchange of gazes needs exposing; Patricia's case is harder to pin down: should we see? What do we expect to find? What would our parameters of looking be? Would we dismiss her if we think she's wrong and just paranoid, or would we sympathise? ).
If photographs are traps, it is paramount to be aware of their quality, despite seeming 'safe territory', to ensnare. In this respect, Poole (1997) observes in her analysis of the circulation of images between Europe and Andean South America, that one important element -easily dismissed in our rush to reveal the complicity between power and representation, or in this case race and representation -is that 'we frequently forget that images are also about the pleasure of looking. Visual images fascinate us. They compel us to look at them, especially when the material they show us is unfamiliar or strange '(1997: 17) .
Considering the history and sometimes questionable social uses of photography can be useful to contextualise this ensnaring process. Since the invention of photography and its 'coincidence' with imperial expansion, scientific racism and changing forms of knowledge linked to logics of comparability and equivalency, images have symbolised a fascinating point of access to the 'other' (consider for example the works of Edwards, 1992; Pinney, 1992; Ryan, 1997; Williams, 2003) . Poole argues that the wide circulation of photographic images played a key role in the 'formation of the racial culture of European modernity' since photographs were a core 'support to an emerging idea of race as a material, historical and biological fact ' (1997: 15) . She not only relates the historical coincidence of the emergence of 'race' with photography but also points towards the ambiguities of photographs' interpretation and the pleasure images produce:
By phrasing identity in the rigorous methods and languages of the biological science of the time, nineteenth century racial theory translated the politics of colonial subjugation into the visual -and aesthetic-calculus of embodied "natural" differences. In saying this, however, I do not want to imply that race operates only or even primarily through visual technologies and discourses.
Nor do I want to say that either vision explains race, or race, vision. Rather, by looking at the historical intersections between visual and racial discourses, (Phelan, 1996: 14) and at the same time it can never provide a total or complete meaning of the 'real' that it intends to signify (it is seen from a particular perspective / place / viewpoint / experience). Phelan (1996) argues that these qualities/defects of the image are precisely the space of creativity where identities can be subverted and contested. Such instability opens ruptures and gaps that can facilitate mechanisms of resistance and change. In this way, the instabilities of the act of looking might not only reproduce discrimination and reify racial stereotypes but also open, or keep open, opportunities to challenge practices of exclusion linked to the visible world. With this in mind, I will now turn to discuss the methodological dilemmas I faced when researching the visible through photographs.
Intimacy, Photographs and Research
The coupling of intimacy and sociological research can be instructive. They both rely on movements from private to public realms and vice versa though in no strict (pre)determined way or order. Intimacy has to do at the same time, with the most private and the most publicly regulated acts and practices. Berlant writes that 'the inwardness of the intimate is met by a corresponding publicness' (Berlant, 2000: 1) .
Often, doing and writing sociological research is the process of intimate listening, of developing the difficult 'art of listening', that is able to extend a story and its small, private minutiae to a 'bigger picture' of public issues (Back, 2007 In asking these questions, I was concerned with two main things: a) respecting the intimate relations created but also a questioning of the ways in which such intimacy is then redistributed and perhaps diluted in the process; and b) the risk that the images would simply constitute a visual confirmation of the stereotypes that inform the discrimination these women experienced in the first place. I also wondered who would be looking? What contexts would inform their gaze? How could the privileges of intimacy be respected but also honoured? As Barthes says when looking at his mother's photographs after her death, 'if I were ever to show them to friends I could doubt that these photographs would speak ' (2000: 64) . I decided not to show them.
Let us look to a further example that unpacks this decision. When talking with
Consuelo and exploring her relation to issues of beauty, appearance and shame, she looked at a portrait of herself and told me about the comments she had received from some of her relatives, mainly her uncles, while growing up: Is it just a rhetorical complaint resigned to silence? That she feels it is even possible to ask for a reason for her appearance seems to me to be the key question. Would then looking at her image give us -and her-an insight to the sources of such beliefs?
Would you be able to 'get into' her experience if I show this image here? Could we then 'really' understand her terms of adequate and acceptable appearance?
Consuelo's questions are simultaneously directed towards the family and the nation.
On the one hand, she is confronting the specific sets of relationships established amongst her family members that allow comments like the above to be shared openly and with no second thoughts (although I would argue that this is by no means a unique characteristic of Consuelo's family but points to a specific sense of cultural 'tolerance' where these utterances are acceptable). On the other, we can also locate her questions in the specific socio-historical context of Mexico and most of Latin America, where racial ideologies of mestizaje operate (De La Cadena, 2001; Knight, 1990; Lomnitz, 1992; Martinez-Echazabal, 1998; Wade, 2004) . The process of mestizaje has offered the subjects of the nation a promise of a 'physical flexibility', of moulding, of a form of racial mixing that, contrary to the US 'one-drop rule', is able to enter in processes of whitening and therefore direct its legacy towards 'perfection'.
This promise has stated that the 'race will be improved', and if it isn't, if people's appearances don't approximate to the 'white ideal', such 'failure' has involved the blaming of individuals for their lack of adequate planning. 
Looking Emotionally
The backdrop of this discussion has been the notion of intimacy, both as closeness and deepness, as demanding private communion, a sense of sharing and public responsibility (Berlant, 2000) . I am not arguing just for 'showing' or 'not showing'
photographs, but rather inviting viewers/readers to exercise their agency through reflexive caution. So, while the photos used in my research were core for looking at issues related to race discourses, notions of beauty and experiences of racism, the ambivalent processes that relate to showing and seeing these images have to be considered for their political implications. On the one hand, it is to turn back to the participants of research projects and honour the intimate space created between us by listening, engaging and 'looking emotionally' at their experience rather than taking for granted our (readers, students, researchers) informed gaze as altogether critical and beyond racist and racialised aesthetic prejudices. On the other, it is to critique the visual politics of beauty and racial stereotyping by engaging with the question of the visible, physical and imagined body and actively decide the sorts of engagements we, as audiences, want to have with the visible. It is to think about, for example, what to do with the ensnaring visual differentiations of skin colours, types of hair, facial features, heights and weights and how to deal with the risk of fixing body differences when aiming to expose the racially informed 'ways of seeing'. As Poole rightly asks, 'how it was that "race" [and beauty] came to be seen at all?' (Poole, 1997: 22) As a way of approaching an image but also as an attitude towards it, 'looking emotionally' refers to the ongoing and open proposal of reflecting on visual research practices and assessing their accompanying processes. It also engages with recent debates about emotions, cultural practices and politics (Ahmed, 2001 (Ahmed, , 2004 Berlant, 2004 Berlant, , 2006 Sedgwick and Frank, 2003; Svasek and Milton, 2005; Zournazi, 2002) .
When using images, specifically personal photographs, as tools for research, these are not just devices for memory work or a mere elicit technique. Rather, photographic images offer an intimate context of interaction between the researcher and the participant that demands a deep listening and, moreover, an emotional visual capacity that engages with all the layers of meaning being conveyed: the album, wall or box where the picture is kept; the pose of the sitter(s) and the detail in the background; the pain in remembering/re-living the shame felt; the doubt about what can be seen and how it feels to see it again; the pervasiveness of racism that infiltrates the minutiae of everyday life. In her 'sociality of emotions' model, Ahmed proposes that emotions are relational in that they move us and attach us to others: 'they involve (re)actions or relations of "towardness" or "awayness" in relation to such objects ' (2004: 8) .
Moreover, emotions are also intentional, being 'about' things and involving directionality towards objects. Emotions are neither located within subjects, as a possession of the self, or without, as something affecting them. Instead, emotions are located in movement, circulating between objects: between images, participants, researcher and readers; between interpretations, contexts and moments of 'reading'.
Emotions are a response (we give to objects) which do not come from 'inside' us as 'reaction', but are produced in-between ourselves and others as 'action'. Looking emotionally is located in such an 'in-between', in the movement and circulation: it is about engaging with the overall experience of selecting, showing, reading, seeing, interpreting and being affected by, a photographic image that is doubly entangled by its raw depiction and its charged 'telling' (by notions of 'race' and by the experience of racism). Looking emotionally means allowing that contact to shape the research interaction and establish a relationality between the researcher and the participant. It happens when the intimate moment of seeing an image is shared, a moment that deals with what is seen but also with how 'that' comes to be seen at all. When talking about deeply painful experiences such as racism, what is at stake is not a challenge for readers to visually confirm what the participants said, but to see with them the ways in which 'a photograph is always invisible: it is not it that we see' (Barthes, 2000: 6) . Ultimately, what the participants shared was a means for us 
